executed similar type operations since the 1950s, but under the guise of other operational constructs, they were relatively small-scale and received little attention at the strategic level. In an era of persistent conflict, some senior leaders within the military are beginning to realize the importance of BPC and its direct linkage to national security. However, much like past efforts, BPC related activities lack a concerted focus as does the types of units designated or designed to conduct this unique type of training, particularly in the field of rotary wing aviation. This paper examines strategic guidance for BPC, depicts a strategic environment that requires the force to be rebalanced, reviews historical examples in which bureaucracy and inter-service rivalries hampered over-all training efforts, and on-going BPC efforts utilizing current aviation force structure and "specialized" units. This paper concludes with a series of recommendations that support the development of a Joint Rotary Wing Security Force Assistance (SFA) organization along with the utilization of general purpose aviation forces to meet future BPC demands.
BUILDING CAPACITY FROM WITHIN: THE NEED FOR A ROTARY WING SFA CAPABILITY
Training is a significant and vital method of furnishing military assistance to most of the less developed countries. The training, carried out both in the United States…and in recipient countries can do far more than merely teach recipients to use military equipment and materials. It brings foreign nationals into close contact with United States citizens under conditions which tend to promote an appreciation of the values of our civilization and way of life. The United States' strategy for BPC comes in many forms, many of which stem from the Department of Defense (DoD). It is important to understand the framework and direction of the strategic guidance set forth by DoD and their plan to support the effort. This paper will examine four subject areas to determine whether or not DoD should invest in building capacity from within its formations or through the development of new or "specialized" organizations. First, a review of the most recent National
Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), as it pertains to BPC, will show that this unique mission has recently received immense focus and has become a means by which "The Long War" can be won. Second, a brief portrayal of the strategic environment suggests that the United States is involved in a "persistent conflict" in which the greatest enemy is time. Unlike combat operations of the past, there may be no definable end that looks like victory as it is commonly viewed from an American perspective; therefore, the traditional mindset amongst senior military leaders as it pertains to organizational transformation must change. Third, the episodic evolution of past capacity building efforts undertaken by the United States military reveal some inter-service rivalries as well as intra-service rivalries (which still exist today) on how and who best is suited for such a unique mission. Fourth, organizing for BPC activities will prove to be a significant challenge in what is known as a VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous) environment. So, should DoD invest in "specialized" forces or rely on general purpose forces (GPF) to conduct BPC activities;
or is a combination of both of these type forces the solution when the demand exceeds capacity, as is currently the case in Iraq and Afghanistan and for the foreseeable future?
In an attempt to answer the previous question, this paper will address incremental steps for growth within the current force structure that will provide potential solutions for both current and future capacity building capabilities. Finally, additional recommendations using the DOTLMPF (doctrine, organization, training, leader development, material, personnel, and facilities) construct will provide a holistic approach that DoD can use to identify where specific shortcomings and deficiencies exist.
The National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the • Increase capabilities to build partner capacity by training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces as well as interdependent joint force/interagency packages proficient in performing large-scale civilmilitary operations needed for stability operations and enabling/transitioning civil authorities.
• Reduce capability gaps in GPF (General Purpose Forces) capability to deploy, plan, and execute missions with indigenous forces and the capability to synchronize and support stability operations.
• Increase DoD capability and capacity to train and equip foreign forces at the operational and tactical levels and to advise foreign defense ministries and military institutions at the strategic level. Efforts should focus on closing gaps in the capability and capacity to train, advise, and assist foreign forces for the purpose of internal defense, stability operations, and counterinsurgency. • Establish, sustain, and expand Global Partnerships that are mutually beneficial.
• Provide global partners the capability and capacity necessary to provide for their own national security.
• Establish the capacity to train, advise, and assist foreign air forces, while conducting partnership activities using USAF Airmen with the appropriate language and cultural skills.
• Develop and enhance partnership capabilities to ensure interoperability, integration, and interdependence, as appropriate.
Because BPC is not an official doctrinal term per se, the separate armed services are charged with the mission of translating the strategic guidance into definable doctrinal missions by which commanders and staffs can plan and execute upon. 
Strategic Environment
Today's U.S. Armed Forces were structured principally to conduct major combat
operations, but what some may find surprising is that the military history of the United States is one characterized by "limited" operations, interrupted by episodes of major combat. 13 Historically, the challenge for military planners has been building the right force for the future fight; because the United States military was designed to do one thing…fight and win the nation's wars. Recently, HQDA established a working group made up of representatives from the operations and intelligence communities as well as senior Army leaders to assess future force structure requirements given the future security environment. 14 The findings of the group were initially published in a CSA (Chief of Staff of the Army) White Paper and expounded upon in an article written by General George Casey, entitled "America's Army In an Era of Persistent Conflict." 15 It outlines the following characteristics needed in the future force:
• Versatile -units with scalable force packages and equipped with adaptable equipment capable of defeating/preventing a wide range of unpredictable threats.
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• Expeditionary -units organized and trained to operate across the spectrum of conflict on a small-scale basis and possess a working knowledge of the host nation language/populace.
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• Interoperable -units capable of operating in conjunction with coalition forces or by, with, and through host nation partners. 18 Past, current, and potential future conflicts provide ample evidence to re-balance the force taking into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of technological advancements juxtaposed with the human, cultural, and political aspects of capacity building efforts.
Episodic Evolution
There's an old saying where the head goes--the body will follow; such has been the case in Army Aviation when it comes to transformation. Army Aviation came into its own as a result of the Howze Board conducted in 1962. Out of the desire to control rotary wing assets in the close air support role, the Army cited two specific areas which were of most concern to leaders during that time, scheduling and timing. The Army believed that only through the direct control of organic assets could the difficulty associated with these two areas be eliminated. Also, since the division was the primary land component force best suited for combined arms, and the use of rotary wing assets during engagements was more responsive than U.S. Air Force assets, the aircraft should be organic to Army divisions. 19 This mindset, although beneficial in the beginning and through much of the Cold War Era, has longed since plagued senior leaders when developing force structure. While the Army has recently changed from a division-based force to a brigade-centric force, it has resisted the creation of special units to deal with counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory operations. In contrast, there have been a number of proposals to create new units and organizations better suited to address the challenges of these mission areas. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' recent challenge to the Army to organize and prepare for asymmetric warfare and advising and training foreign armies could renew and elevate this debate. 20 If Army leaders, specifically in the aviation community, heed the Secretary of Defense's challenge, it would be prudent for them to look to the past in order to examine the episodic evolution of organizations that are best suited to address the challenges mentioned above. called for an aviation-FID capability with "uniquely skilled personnel and for short takeoff and landing aircraft." in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility. 34 As a result, AFSOC submitted a statement of needs to USSOCOM calling for the development of a unit solely dedicated to conducting FID operations. 35 The Army however, expressed reservations as it normally had in the past when such matters arose concerning aviation roles and responsibilities. In 1991, General Carl Stiner, USSOCOM Commander, directed that the evolving aviation-FID be "joint", which meant both Army SOF and Air Force SOF equipment and personnel be assigned to a single unit. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), along with the United States Aviation Center (USAAVNC), resisted the initiative and claimed that such scarce resources should not be dedicated to an aviation-FID capability, but rather should be dedicated to providing direct support to special operations ground forces as it was currently doing with the 160 th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). Also, the resistance was primarily rooted in the fear that ongoing initiatives to modernize the fleet of aircraft assigned to the 160 th SOAR would be jeopardized. 36 The historical constraints of developing capabilities within our own force to provide adequate capacity building efforts to partner nations still exist today. Four decades of operational experience coupled with the on-going efforts today in Iraq and
Afghanistan indicate the cost of not being prepared. DoD has a choice --either maintain the status quo and accept that for each conflict there will be separate and desynchronized effort that "rushes" to build capacity, or organize a capability designed to provide partner nations with a focused, capabilities-based approach to build capacity throughout the spectrum of conflict.
Organizing for Rotary Wing Security Force Assistance
The success of BPC lies within the organization(s) conducting the actual mission.
The 2008 GEF specifies eight means in achieving the strategic goal of "Winning the Long War," 37 two of which focus on force structure. First, military planners within the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) must take into consideration "The Total was activated in 1994 for the specific purpose of providing combatant commanders the ability to assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces. 42 The one-of-a-kind squadron, specifically designed to conduct operations throughout the spectrum of conflict, is currently DOD's sole permanently standing unit for training partner aviation forces. Despite the unit's criticality prior to 9-11, and especially over the past eight years, limitations do exist, of which the majority lie within the manpower area. Built on the premise that such a unique capability would be employed in conjunction with other security cooperation activities in several GCC areas of responsibility, the majority of which are small-scale by nature and in scope, the unit was never designed for mass employment. It was purposely designed to reflect and operate similar to a United States Special Forces Operational Detachment -Alpha (ODA) and Operational DetachmentBravo (ODB). Similar to the geographically oriented Special Forces Groups, 6 th SOS teams deploys tailorable teams specific to the needs of the host nation.
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Although the aforementioned units past and current endeavors have produced positive results within the realm of aviation capacity of supported host nations, DoD continues to struggle with a concerted effort focused on future requirements and capabilities. To accurately address organizational requirements for training partner nation aviation forces, it's important to review the capabilities within DoD that currently exist. Table 1 Preponderance of equipment/personnel as well as current mission profile does and to what extent a RW BPC/SFA capability should be organized and/or employed.
Beyond simply examining the physical capabilities of each service is the difficult task of assessing the demand for a DoD RW BPC/SFA capability. Aside from the challenges of dynamic strategic environment and potential future hot-spots, cost and benefit will undoubtedly be determining factors in future BPC/SFA organizations.
Recently, a RAND study was conducted at the request of USASOC to determine the feasibility of such an organization. The study examined a series of U.S. operations conducted post -World War II to present. 45 The operations were categorized into five The analysis applied to these operations revealed that Level 5 operations are almost 1,000 times more expensive than a Level 3 operation, therefore implying if there is a 1/1000 th chance of a Level 3 operation succeeding, thereby preventing a Level 5 operation, the Level 3 operation is the preferable choice. A DOTLMPF analysis provides a comprehensive viewpoint when force structure changes are being considered. The following DOTMLPF recommendations are considered long term, but require immediate and sustained attention if momentum is to be maintained in building a RW BPC/SFA capability:
• Doctrine: There is no current RW SFA doctrine; however, the core • Organization: DoD has provided adequate guidance to the armed services to examine the development of "specialized units" to conduct BPC/SFA missions; however, little to no resources have been allocated for specific force development. Regardless, USSOCOM, in conjunction with the other services, should form an Integrated Capabilities Development Team (ICDT) to assess capability gaps across DoD, which should lead to a DOTMLPF change recommendation (DCR) for the development of a RW SFA joint force.
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• Training: The PME system requires expansion at the institutional level to address the growing requirement for advisors in the GCC AORs. Emphasis should be given to the priority countries within a respective GCC AOR.
Aviation specific training should only be directed towards partner nations in which new capabilities are being developed and to those countries that are capable of self-sustainment after SFA support has ended.
• Leadership: A Joint RW SFA organization requires experienced Officers and
Non-Commissioned Officers with requisite skills in SFA related activities. An additional skill identifier (ASI) for O-3s and E-7s and above should be implemented allowing individuals to attend appropriate PME and serve in an SFA capacity for the duration of their career.
• Material: The recommended Joint RW SFA organization requires certain types of aircraft that are common to partner nation aviation forces. For example, the 3-210 th AVN Regiment owned and operated six Mi-17 helicopters for two purposes, maintain proficiency of assigned aircrews and conduct training of foreign aircrews in CONUS. The 6 th SOS also has organic helicopters, but primarily uses them for in-house training. Their expeditionary mission and contractual agreements with partner nations allow them to utilize that military's aircraft while conducting SFA activities. Without the ability to train and maintain proficiency in unique aircraft, a RW SFA organization's effectiveness is drastically reduced.
• Personnel: Personalities and human nature are determining factors when "specialized" units are formed and manned. Building a RW SFA organization should be no different. Assignment to such an organization should be done through an accession process along with psychological assessments to determine mental aptitude for the complex environments SFA operations are likely to take place. SFA trained personnel must possess multiple competencies above and beyond their technical expertise such as cultural and language training.
• Facilities: Similar to the complex process used for force development, the Assuming strategic decisions on national security, budgeting, and mission priorities for the armed services, as they pertain to BPC, continue on the current course, the U.S. military will fall short of its requirement to adequately train partner nation aviation forces when and where they are needed most. The single-most important challenge for senior military leaders is how to balance the force in order to conduct effective operations throughout the spectrum of conflict, realizing that Phase 0 operations are just as, if not more important, than Phase 3, 4, and 5 operations. A Joint RW SFA organization, such as the one proposed in this paper and augmented with specific general purpose force (GPF) capabilities on a mission-by-mission basis, will provide GCCs the ability to strategically affect a partner nation's military capacity.
Aviation, in and of itself, is a strategic asset, albeit an expensive asset. As indicated previously, the values of training partner nations far outweigh the costly endeavors of major combat operations. Current and potential future partner nations will normally not seek to purchase and/or maintain high tech aircraft similar to that of advanced nations. Therefore, the cost to train developing partner nations cannot be compared to what it costs to procure, maintain, and modernize advanced systems.
In an era of persistent conflict where threats come in many forms, demands placed upon the military will be as complex and uncertain as the environments in which they will be required to operate. Senior military leaders must continuously asses the need to develop new capabilities and break through historical barriers to build the right force, at the right time, in the right place. 
